Alternative Energy

How China Gets Its Oil → How It Could Replace Iran and Venezuela

China gets less than 10% of crude from Iran and Venezuela. With 1.5% per year growth in oil production and a 10% per year combustion engine reduction, Iran and Venezuela barrels can be offset in about 3 years

T Jackson

06 Mar 2026 — 4 min read

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Abstract

China uses oil for trucks, ships, planes, and petrochemicals. It produces a large amount of crude oil at home, but it still imports most of the crude it consumes. In 2024, China imported about 11.1 million barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil, equal to about 74% of China’s crude oil use.

Below is a breakdown of China’s crude oil supply in 2024, shown as percentages of China’s total crude oil supply. Country shares come from the EIA’s 2024 report. These percentages can change each month. They might shift by 1–2 points for major suppliers. This happens because of seasonal demand, market changes, and shipping issues. This variability shows that supply shares can change due to geopolitical or economic shifts.

Shares of China’s total crude oil supply (2024):

Domestic China: 26.0%
Russia: 14.8%
Saudi Arabia: 10.4%
Iran: 8.1%
Iraq: 7.4%
Oman: 5.2%
United Arab Emirates: 4.4%
Brazil: 4.4%
Angola: 3.7%
United States: 1.5%
Venezuela: 1.5%
Other countries (combined): 12.6%

92% of imported crude comes by sea. Most of it moves through pipelines. Pipeline sources originate mostly in Russia, with contributions from Kazakhstyan and Myanmar. This matters because seaborne oil is more exposed to shipping disruptions from hostile countries.

Iran and Venezuela matter because their crude is often discounted due to sanctions, and China is a key buyer. In January 2026, Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy projected that China would import about 1.38 million barrels per day from Iran. They also expected imports from Venezuela to reach 389,000 barrels per day by 2025. That totals roughly 1.77 million b/d.

How long could it take to replace Iran and Venezuela under the stated policy scenario?

A scenario that has only three key points:

1) Domestic oil production increases by 1.5% each year—reasonable.
2) No new gasoline or diesel cars or two-wheelers are sold—they are rapidly doing this now.
3) China removes 10% of its combustion road vehicles, including trucks, every year. It’s costly, but it is possible for a communist country that prioritizes its people.

A reasonable estimate is about 3 years to replace the volume of Iran and Venezuela's imports. The key driver is the 10% yearly removal of combustion vehicles. After 3 years, the combustion road fleet would be about 0.9 × 0.9 × 0.9 = 0.729, a 27% reduction. The EIA estimated China’s gasoline use at about 3.2 million b/d in August 2024, and diesel use at around 3.9 million b/d in June 2024. For diesel, heavy trucks currently do, and planes will rely on it for an indefinite period. If road fuel use is about 5–6 million b/d, then a 27% cut would roughly reduce oil demand by 1.4–1.6 million b/d over three years.

Domestic supply growth is smaller but still helps. Starting from roughly 4.2–4.3 million b/d of domestic crude production, a 1.5% annual increase adds about 0.2 million b/d after three years. Demand cuts (about 1.5 million b/d) plus extra domestic supply (about 0.2 million b/d) close the 1.77 million b/d gap.

Side humor: I had to pull out my calculator for that section.

What China is capable of doing in the meantime.

Even with a three-year path, China would still need short-term tools to avoid a sudden squeeze.

1) Use stockpiles. China has about 900 million barrels in strategic inventories. That’s roughly 78 days’ worth of imports, according to Reuters. In comparison, the EIA estimated about 290 million barrels in the government’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 2024.
2) Shift suppliers. Purchases may increase from major suppliers, including Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, and Brazil. This can help fill some of the gap, but prices might be higher than for discounted barrels.
3) Do not export any oil or hydrocarbon fuels. Tell refiners not to sign any new fuel export contracts. Reuters reported that this had happened before when supply conditions were tight.

Conclusion

China’s crude oil supply is roughly one-quarter domestic and three-quarters imported. Iran and Venezuela are meaningful but not dominant suppliers by volume. China could replace the combined oil volume of Iran and Venezuela in about three years. This would happen under a bold plan that:

Increases domestic oil production by 1.5% per year.
Stop the sale of passenger combustion-engine vehicles.
Removes 10% of combustion road vehicles each year, ending new ICE passenger sales. This would need an increase in EV production.
Stockpiles, other suppliers, and temporary fuel export limits can help during this transition.

Moving away from Iran and Venezuela might leave China vulnerable to price swings and sudden disruptions if global markets tighten. Any sudden change in suppliers or demand patterns may also lead to a temporary increase in costs for refiners and consumers. These risks highlight the need for careful planning and flexibility during the transition period. Then again, this is, and has always been, a risk for crude oil in every country.

The key point is that China can replace sanctioned oil imports within 3 years through smart domestic policies. By planning now, policymakers and investors can manage short-term risks. This also helps to improve long-term energy security.

Losing the two suppliers (Iran and Venezuela) equals less than 10%—not a big issue for capable leaders.

References:

https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countrieslong/China/pdf/China-2025.pdf
https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/where-china-gets-its-oil-crude-imports-in-2025-reveal-stockpiling-and-changing-fortunes-of-certain-suppliers-including-those-sanctioned/
https://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/press/7229/chinas-car-industry-set-to-overshoot-net-zero-emissions-pathway-greenpeace/
https://www.ogj.com/general-interest/economics-markets/article/55244343/eia-details-factors-behind-declining-gasoline-consumption-in-china
https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/012225-chinas-oil-product-demand-to-extend-decline-by-2-in-2025-cnpc-etri
https://www.hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2026/01/chinas-2025-refinery-throughput-crude-and-gas-output-hit-new-highs/